In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics Reconsidered: Theory and Method in a Post-Christian, Post-Modern AgeH. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. (bio)A candid assessment of the moral significance of our post-Christian, post-modern era calls for a reconsideration of the very project of bioethics. For many bioethicists, concerns for theory and method are secondary. 1 These scholars presuppose a common morality and a reasonable, overlapping consensus regarding [End Page 336] an appropriate polity. They assume as (...) well that we, as humans, possess middle-level principles, casuistic capacities, and guiding intuitions that enable us, inter alia, to identify which allocations of health care are unfair, whether the purchase of organs from the poor is exploitative, and if physicians may require as a condition for treatment agreement on a professional standard for the disclosure of information in the acquisition of consent. In this account of bioethics, we are taken to share a content-full moral understanding. Theory may illuminate that understanding and method may resolve particular controversies, but neither is necessary to disclose the nature of the moral life in the domain of health care. The account presents us as bound by a content-full morality, about which we have pretheoretical knowledge and in terms of which we are able to reach appropriate decisions, even if we have competing theoretical understandings of that morality.This dominant account of bioethics has interesting similarities with Roman Catholic moral theology in assuming (1) the existence of a common canonical morality grounded in our nature, our sentiments, and/or our reason, as well as (2) the ability of reason, reflection, or analysis to disclose the substance of that morality. The difficulty is that there are diverse moral sentiments, sympathies, and visions. The depth of our disagreements can be gauged in our substantive disputes regarding abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and health care reform. Furthermore, no appeal to middle-level principles or to casuistry can bridge such differences when people really disagree. Such appeals only underscore what separates.Consider how an appeal to the principle of autonomy or justice in mediating disputes regarding the licensing of for-profit euthanatization services or the enactment of a health care proposal like that produced by the Clinton administration in 1993 (White House 1993) will only disclose how deep the disagreements are, if the disputants are a Rawlsian and a Nozickian (Rawls 1971, Nozick 1974). Or, consider an appeal to casuistry for the resolution of health care policy debates among parties, some of whom consider dumping and skimming to be morally exemplar acts of autonomy, frankness, and appropriate stewardship of resources (Engelhardt and Rie 1988), while the other parties regard them as exemplar acts of injustice. Such disputants will agree neither about the proper descriptions of the cases, nor about how to derive moral guidance from them, because they bring to the cases disparate moral senses and different understandings of moral rationality. In a world in which there are as many different accounts of fairness and justice as there are major religions, and where many may hold that exploiters are those who do not allow the poor to sell their organs to the rich, the presumption of a moral consensus or background morality (Bayertz 1994) serves more as an ideology than as a general authoritative moral disclosure. [End Page 337]In addition, it is not possible to choose among many 2 of the competing visions or accounts of justice, fairness, and appropriate behavior on the basis of sound rational argument. To choose authoritatively among competing content-full moralities or moral accounts, one must already have background moral guidance. If one is to choose the account that maximizes benefits over harms, one must be able to compare competing benefits. For example, in terms of consequences, one cannot compare liberty and equality outcomes without already knowing how to rank liberty and equality. One must already know the answer about which morality—e.g., the one that gives priority to liberty over equality, or the one that gives priority to equality over liberty—is authoritative. Nor will an appeal to preference satisfaction solve the difficulty of determining how to establish the canonical ethics and bioethics. One must first know how one should correct preferences, compare impassioned versus considered... (shrink)

: Its promises to the contrary notwithstanding, bioethics is plural. There is a diversity of content-full moral understandings of the good and the right. Moreover, there is no secular means in principle to set this diversity aside without begging the question. This moral diversity exists both as a sociological condition and as a moral epistemological constraint. Without succumbing to a metaphysical scepticism or moral relativism, the bioethics of the future, if it is to be honest, should learn how to live (...) with robust moral diversity. (shrink)

The concepts of health and disease play pivotal roles in medicine and the health professions This volume brings together the requisite literature for understanding current discussions and debates these concepts. The selections in the volume attempt to present a wide range of views concerning the nature of the concepts of health and issues using both historical and contemporary sources -- Back cover.

"A book from the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and Ethics." Includes bibliographical references (p. [141]-195) and index.

This collection of essays, Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, deals with the issue of the repeated failure of attempts to derive a universal set of ...

This book is the first systematic integrated analysis of ethical issues in health care which combines an introduction to moral theory, a set of readings in health care ethics, and an extensive set of case studies.

Modern philosophy is based on the presupposition of the certainty of the ego’s experience. Both Descartes and Kant assume this certitude as the basis for certain knowledge. Here the argument is developed that this ego has its sources not only in Scholastic philosophy, but also in the narrative of the emotional self as developed by both the troubadours and the medieval mystics. This narrative self has three moments: salvation, self-irony, and nostalgia. While salvation is rooted in the Christian tradition, self-irony (...) and nostalgia are first addressed in twelfth-century troubadour poetry in Occitania. Their integration into a narrative self was developed in late medieval mysticism, and reached its fullest articulation in St. Teresa of Avila, whom Descartes read. (shrink)

Bioethics is a relatively young discipline. Within it, discussion is still taking place concerning the methodological status of the subject. Nevertheless, putting aside this inner aspect of bioethics, one thing appears striking. The short-lived existence of bioethics is surprisingly associated with a great number of bioethical projects, aimed at tackling complex problems, arising in the realm of health care. It seems that the rapid enhancement of biomedical sciences and biotechnologies - carrying with it many moral dilemmas - creates a pressure (...) leading to a new sort of ethical reflection, as well as deepening further existing reflections. Looking more generally and somewhat superficially at existing approaches to bioethical matters, one can distinguish two tendencies. One of them puts forward creating a general ethical system drawing upon a specific notion of morality, and drawing up a set of moral rules and principles. The second one finds its starting point in separate cases, in their analyses, playing down the role of general moral theories. The best example of such an approach is a modern casuistry catching on especially in English speaking countries. The spreading tendency of casuistic analyses does not eliminate the fact that many bioethicists still make an effort to pursue the first of the mentioned trends by building up a general bioethical framework. Hugo Tristram Engelhardt is a good example of such a thinker. He is a medical doctor and philosopher working at Rice University in Houston. In the course of over 30 years of his medical and philosophical research, Engelhardt has outlined two bioethical projects: the project of secular bioethics and the project of Christian bioethics. (shrink)

Bioethics is a relatively young discipline. Within it, discussion is still taking place concerning the methodological status of the subject. Nevertheless, putting aside this inner aspect of bioethics, one thing appears striking. The short-lived existence of bioethics is surprisingly associated with a great number of bioethical projects, aimed at tackling complex problems, arising in the realm of health care. It seems that the rapid enhancement of biomedical sciences and biotechnologies - carrying with it many moral dilemmas - creates a pressure (...) leading to a new sort of ethical reflection, as well as deepening further existing reflections. Looking more generally and somewhat superficially at existing approaches to bioethical matters, one can distinguish two tendencies. One of them puts forward creating a general ethical system drawing upon a specific notion of morality, and drawing up a set of moral rules and principles. The second one finds its starting point in separate cases, in their analyses, playing down the role of general moral theories. The best example of such an approach is a modern casuistry catching on especially in English speaking countries. The spreading tendency of casuistic analyses does not eliminate the fact that many bioethicists still make an effort to pursue the first of the mentioned trends by building up a general bioethical framework. Hugo Tristram Engelhardt is a good example of such a thinker. He is a medical doctor and philosopher working at Rice University in Houston. In the course of over 30 years of his medical and philosophical research, Engelhardt has outlined two bioethical projects: the project of secular bioethics and the project of Christian bioethics. (shrink)

Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. offers erudite and compelling arguments for the view that all families should try to realize the traditional family. Although I tend to agree with him from my personal standpoint, I doubt that this view can be justified to those with whom we are in reasonable disagreement about the family. I make three critical points. First, though Engelhardt stops short of saying that the state should encourage people to form traditonal families, or discourage those who (...) do not, some state perfectionists might do so. From the perspective of public reason, it is unjust for the state to favor some conceptions of the good over others, if these conceptions are all reasonable. Moreover, those whose conceptions of the good are not favored would feel that they are disrespected. Second, insofar as Engelhardt thinks that all families should try to realize the traditional families, the traditional family would not be a good to those who do not like children. Moreover, it would be difficult to persuade those who have decided not to have children for reasons of career, burden, or more altruistic concern. Third, against Engelhardt’s stance against the “egalitarian aspirations” of liberalism, I argue that too often women sacrifice their possible careers for the sake of the family, even should they hold advanced degrees from prestigious universities, or professional qualifications. This kind of injustice is too uncomfortable to ignore. (shrink)

In June 2018 the Texan philosopher and distinguished bioethicist Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. crossed the great divide to meet his maker, as he would probably put it. His work remains till now the most systematic effort to fully revise Bioethics based on the doctrines of the Orthodox Christian theology, while it is also apreciseaccount ofEthics and Bioethics in the “after God” era. Engelhardt was anexcellent master of ancient Greek, medieval, western and eastern philosophy, and after heconverted from the (...) Roman Catholic to the Eastern Orthodox Church – officially the Orthodox Catholic Church – he indulged in the works of the Holy Fathers andbecame greatly influenced by them. This is clearlymanifest in his views and continuous reference to Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers. His conversion crucially influenced not only his bioethical views, but also his entire philosophical system. This magnificent journey obviously turned the Texan philosopher into a true Theologist – not in the academic sense, but in the one the Orthodox Catholic Church accepts, according to which “a Theologist is a person of God, from God, before God and speaks to praise God”. Engelhardt was not the first to deal with bioethical issues under the spectrum of Orthodox Theology, but he was the first to unravel both secular and Western-Church Bioethics and suggest a totally different version of Bioethicsbased on the principles of Orthodox ethics, the ceremonial and esoteric life of the Orthodox Church, having previously made himself a true communicant of both the paternal tradition and dogmatic teaching. (shrink)

In Bioethics and Secular Humanism: The Search for a Common Morality, Tristram Engelhardt examines various possibilities of finding common ground for moral discourse among people from different traditions and concludes their futility. In this paper I will argue that many of the assumptions on which Engelhardt bases his conclusion about the impossibility of a content-full secular bioethics are problematic. By starting with the notion of moral strangers, there is no possibility, by definition, for a content-full moral discourse (...) among moral strangers. It means that there is circularity in starting the inquiry with a definition of moral strangers, which implies that they do not share enough moral background or commitment to an authority to allow for reaching a moral agreement, and concluding that content-full morality is impossible among moral strangers. I argue that assuming traditions as solid and immutable structures that insulate people across their boundaries is problematic. Another questionable assumption in Engelhardt’s work is the idea that religious and philosophical traditions provide content-full moralities. As the cardinal assumption in Engelhardt’s review of the various alternatives for a content-full moral discourse among moral strangers, I analyze his foundationalist account of moral reasoning and knowledge and indicate the possibility of other ways of moral knowledge, besides the foundationalist one. Then, I examine Engelhardt’s view concerning the futility of attempts at justifying a content-full secular bioethics, and indicate how the assumptions have shaped Engelhardt’s critique of the alternatives for the possibility of content-full secular bioethics. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt''s attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or content-full bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to (...) either nihilism or relativism. The first is the view that there is not even one true or valid moral code, and the second is the view that there is a plurality of true or valid moral codes. However, Engelhardt rejects both nihilism and relativism, at least in unrestricted form. Strictly speaking, he himself is a universalist, someone who believes that there is a single true moral code. Two argumentative strategies are employed by him to fend off unconstrained nihilism and relativism. The first argues that although all attempts to establish a content-full morality on the basis of secular reason fail, secular reason can still establish a content-less, purely procedural morality. Although not content-full and incapable of providing positive direction in life, much less a meaning of life, such a morality does limit the range of relativism and nihilism. The second argues that there is a single true, content-full morality. Grace and revelation, however, are needed to make it available to us; secular reason alone is not up to the task. This second line of argument is not pursued in The Foundations at any length, but it does crop up at times, and if it is sound, nihilism and relativism can be much more thoroughly routed than the first line of argument has it.Engelhardt''s position and argumentative strategies are exposed at length and accorded a detailed critical examination. In the end, it is concluded that neither strategy will do, and that Engelhardt is probably committed to some form of relativism. (shrink)

Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. is a philosopher and a physician who has devoted all his life and all his creative power to developing and promoting a Christian bioethics. At the same time, the American is a personality who polarizes and has received euphoric praise on the one hand and malicious criticism on the other. This has already been the case during his lifetime and will presumably remain so even after his death, which we wish to commemorate here. In (...) the following contribution I intend to investigate why Engelhardt provokes so different reactions in the scientific community, and I will try to bring closer together the two seemingly irreconcilable parties of Engelhardt admirers and Engelhardt critics. I will do this by focusing on the two most controversial aspects of his research, his critique of the status quo and his concept of an independent Christian bioethics. (shrink)

Tristram Engelhardt provides an important set of reflections for bioethics in a secular context. Taking Engelhardt's work as its point of departure this article explores the challenges that Jewish ethicists face in contributing to bioethics in a secular context. The article explores how the Jewish tradition can address issues in bioethics in ways that are true to its tradition and at the same time accessible and relevant to "moral strangers" in a secular society. Keywords: bioethics, Engelhardt, (...) Jewish tradition, moral strangers, multicultural, natural law CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

COSTA, Alexandre da. Fundamentos da bioética: estudo sobre o pensamento de Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. FERREIRA, Amauri Carlos. O imaginário religioso e modos de vida urbana: experiência e memória da Juventude Católica em Belo Horizonte – MG, anos 80. GONÇALVES, Davidson Sepini. O Panóptico de Jeremy Bentham: por uma leitura utilitarista. GÓIS, Aurino José. Parque Municipal de Belo Horizonte: público, apropriações e significados. FARIA, Paulo Antônio Couto. Teologia no limiar da filosofia: a modernidade e o encontro fé e (...) razão na obra de Henrique Cláudio de Lima Vaz. (shrink)

Pavel Dmitrievich Tishchenko, one of the founders of Russian bioethics, turned 75 on January 10, 2022. Joining the numerous congratulations, journal “Bioethics” publishes the text of the discussion dedicated to this event. The discussion was initiated by the question of the history of Russian bioethics formation in the perspective of its simultaneous emergence in Moscow, Volgograd, St. Petersburg, Kazan. The participants exchanged opinions on the significance of I.T. Frolov's ideas for the formation of the Moscow School of Bioethics. The influence (...) of the concept of "frontier" proposed by Tristram Engelhardt Jr. on the formation of distinctive features of Russian bioethics was revealed during the discussion. It is emphasized that at the early stages of its formation Russian bioethics was more concerned with the problems of clinical trials than with the moral dilemmas arising from medical practice. An important stage for self-understanding of bioethics was the events of the Afghan company, which exposed the imperfection of the healthcare system in the USSR. The discussion touches a critical examination of the traditional principles of bioethics. The conversation of the philosophical foundations of modern bioethics allowed to formulate two theoretical opinions. The firs assertion determines that philosophical theories delay with revolutionary changes in the field of medical and scientific practice. The second one determines the need for the formation of stable teacher-student relations sufficient for enculturation with the tradition of thinking. The participants noted the undoubted humanizing influence of these principles on clinical practice and scientific research. At the same time the risks associated with an attempt to transfer the principles that was established in the Western tradition into the practices of Russian medicine and science were identified. Speakers claimed the idea of harmonization the principles to the traditions of Russian philosophy and ethics. Thus, the medical art should be conceived as an active mercy, and many bioethical problems as social challenges that require solidarity. It was noted, that bioethics is transforming from type of value-based communication of specialists to a formalized procedure. (shrink)

L’auteur traite de la question fondamentale qui est une personne et, plus spécifiquement, si tous les êtres humains sont des personnes ou s’il existe des êtres humains qui ne seraient pas des personnes et qui n’auraient donc pas les mêmes droits à la vie que celles-ci. Certains philosophes, tels que Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, se sont proposés de résoudre bon nombre des délicats problèmes bioéthiques contemporains en distinguant, d’une part, la vie humaine biologique, propre à (...) l’être humain et, d’autre part, la vie humaine personnelle, qui est celle de la personne à laquelle est octroyé un droit à la vie. L’auteur soutient que tout être humain est fondamentalement une personne. The author discusses the fundamental question who is a person and more specifically if every human being is a person or if there exists some human beings who are not persons and who do not have the same rights to life as the human being. In an attempt to resolve a good number of delicate bioethical problems some philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, propose to distinguish between human biological life, belonging to all human beings, and human personal life, which belongs to a person to whom is accorded the right to life. The author maintains that every human being is fundamentally a person. (shrink)

The allocation of resources for health, as well as the distribution of other social goods, being a political problem, can also be observed as belonging to the universe of distributive justice, considering that all citizens must have the necessary means for an acceptable physical, psychological and social performance. Individual autonomy, paradigm of a full citizenship in a modern society, cannot otherwise be achieved. Human dignity seems to imply that no citizen can be excluded from the basic health system due to (...) the lack of financial resources. Indeed, equal access of all citizens to basic social goods and therefore to key places in society – principle of fair equality of opportunities – is one of the core aspects of Rawls's difference principle. It is, in essence, about ensuring the exercise of the right to individual self-determination in the relationship between the individual and society, as well as the right to play a social role according to skills and merit. But, it is not only the theory of the social contract that provides for a fair equality of opportunities. Different perspectives of justice contemplate this ideal. As suggested by Tristram Engelhardt Jr individual autonomy must be interpreted as a value in itself and a determining factor for the exercise of a full citizenship. But, justice is an ideal that must be progressively built. Whether in a specific society or on a global scale. And, the great challenge of humanity is precisely to recognize the existing intercultural differences and propose sufficiently flexible ideological systems that can be applied in different countries with very different levels of social and economic development. Without detracting from the ethical principles that should underpin the construction of the 21st century global society. (shrink)

The Foundations of Christian Bioethics is Tristram Engelhardt’s long awaited sequel to his 1996 (2d ed) The Foundations of Bioethics. It is a passionate, probing and passionate work of “Orthodox theology” (p.199) by one of our most powerful and provocative thinkers. In this Foundations Engelhardt revisits many of the arguments raised in his earlier works. However, this time they are framed with a more explicit focus on Christian bioethics as the alternative: secular bioethics, an ethics of consent (...) and contract between moral strangers, is unable to offer a contentful ethic, which requires the shared values exhibited by Christian bioethics; libertarian cosmopolitan bioethics, with its emphasis on freedom, is acceptable to traditional Christians because it allows them to live according to their beliefs; liberal bioethics violates its own premises of neutrality by asserting values of individual equality rejected by traditional Christians who are “a vexatious thorn in the side of secular bioethics” (2) because they reject these standards and assert the primacy of God. In this book, Engelhardt enlarges on these themes and attempts to establish “traditional” or “first millennium Christianity”(1) as the source of the one true bioethics. He criticizes virtually all of Western Christianity as corrupt versions of secular ethics, ruptured from the Christianity of the first millennium by the emergence of scholasticism, the Protestant reformation and the Enlightenment. Engelhardt argues that Western Christianity, with its emphasis upon natural law and rational discourse are focused not on God but on the “truly human” (134). They have made humanity the measure of all things - and humanity doesn’t measure up. In its place, Engelhardt posits a Christianity based upon the noetic experience - a radical opening up of the person to the transcendent personal God who endows that person with the knowledge of the truth of God’s commandments. While reflection and spiritual guidance are necessary to overcome the corrupting influences of human desires resulting from the Fall of Adam, traditional Christianity is liturgically based. True knowledge rests not on reason but in the experience of a personal and loving God encountered through prayer and ascetic practice. Nonetheless, the believer does not act directly out of that experience. Engelhardt permits no personal revelation or individual conscience. Engelhardt’s Christian follows the guidance offered by the scriptures and selected Saints within the Eastern Orthodox tradition. The noetic experience simply assures the believer that the revealed principles of traditional Christianity are true. (shrink)

In a morally pluralist, or in Alasdair MacIntyre's terms “morally fragmented”, society it seems almost inevitable that people engaging with issues of bioethics should operate within something like John Rawls's idea of an “overlapping consensus”—the area in which there is broad agreement between people with different comprehensive worldviews, and in which they are able and willing to operate with the shared criteria of what Rawls calls “public reason”. There are, of course, those who are uneasy about this approach, usually because (...) they see moral fragmentation as being more pervasive and consensus more difficult to achieve, than the Rawlsians believe. From opposite wings Alasdair MacIntyre and Tristram Engelhardt join forces to question the viability of the liberal consensus. There are, of course, problems with an overlapping consensus. People with religious convictions often feel that …. (shrink)